Notre Dame Law Review Reflection
Volume 92

Issue 1

Article 11

2017

Incentivizing Graffiti: Extending Copyright Protection to a
Prominent Artistic Movement
Sara Cloon
Notre Dame Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr_online
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sara Cloon, Essay, Incentivizing Graffiti: Extending Copyright Protection to a Prominent Artistic Movement,
92 Notre Dame L. Rev. Online 54 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr_online/vol92/iss1/11

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review Reflection by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For
more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

INCENTIVIZING GRAFFITI:
EXTENDING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION TO A
PROMINENT ARTISTIC MOVEMENT
Sara Cloon∗
INTRODUCTION
1

“Copyright is for losers.” Or so asserted graffiti artist Banksy while
also asserting his rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act of
2
1988.
Banksy claims to be anti-copyright, yet simultaneously uses
copyright law to enforce his intellectual property rights. As the popularity
of graffiti rises, there is a growing need for legal protection for graffiti
artists who create unsanctioned work. Consumers and the public are
gaining interest in this artistic movement and often are appropriating these
artists’ work without permission, and artists in turn are bringing more
lawsuits in an attempt to assert a copyright to protect their art. The
question then becomes whether graffiti, specifically unsanctioned graffiti,
has copyright protection and whether it deserves such protection.
This Note focuses solely on copyright issues and not the destruction or
removal of works of graffiti art. Owning the physical embodiment of the
work, such as the wall on which it was painted, does not create title to the
3
copyright.
The property owners have the rights over the physical
4
embodiment, but copyright law protects the intangible aspects of the
5
work. Part I of this Note outlines a brief history of graffiti and explains
∗ Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Bachelor of Arts,
University of Notre Dame, 2014.
I thank the editors of Volume 92 of
Notre Dame Law Review Online for their diligence throughout the editing process.
1 Dan Karmel, Off the Wall: Abandonment and the First Sale Doctrine, 45 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 353, 356 n.23 (2012) (quoting BANKSY, WALL AND PIECE 2 (2005)).
2 Id. at 356 n.24 (quoting BANKSY, supra note 1, at 2).
3 Celia Lerman, Protecting Artistic Vandalism: Graffiti and Copyright Law, 2
N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 295, 317 (2013).
4 See id.
5 Id. at 309. An owner then has the right to paint over or destroy the graffiti that is
on the owner’s property. Id. at 326. Assuming that graffiti is copyrightable, the physical
property owner does not have a right to the underlying intellectual property in that work.
See id. at 325. For instance, the owner could not take a photo of that graffiti, reproduce it on
a bag, and sell it.
54
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what constitutes a work of graffiti. Part II emphasizes the growing
importance of graffiti as an accepted and widespread artistic movement.
Part III explains the copyright requirements under the Copyright Act and
the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), and then Part IV applies these
requirements to graffiti. Finally, Part V argues that under an incentivebased theory of intellectual property, copyright law should not exclude
graffiti when it already fits within statutory law, as this would create
inefficiency and contradiction in copyright law, which is meant to
continually expand to accept new art forms.
I.

WHAT IS GRAFFITI?

The current graffiti movement gained popularity in the 1970s, but it is
rooted in the deeper history of La Grotte de Lascaux from 18,000 BCE,
Egyptian hieroglyphs, markings found on tombs from the pre-Christian era,
6
and 2000-year-old murals from Pompeii. Graffiti is not only a modern art
7
form, but also “an ancient configuration of the artistic dialogue.” The
current style of graffiti began in the 1970s with “tagging” or signing one’s
name in a particular style in order to mark territory or as a form of
8
rebellion. This practice soon developed from merely signing one’s name
9
to focusing on the artistic style of the writing. In the 1980s, graffiti began
10
to move from vandalism to an artistic form of expression. Today graffiti
is no longer found purely on the streets, but is also sold in art galleries and
11
displayed in museums, illustrating the growing acceptance and popularity
of what was once seen as mere defacement of property with a spray can.
Graffiti is an artistic movement that encompasses many subsets and
styles. It can be created through spray-paint, stencils, painting with brushes
and rollers, stickers, posters, mosaics, lighting installations, and many other
12
materials. Street art is a subset of graffiti that includes “stickers, wheatpaste posters, stenciled paintings, downloaded images from the Web, as
13
well as free-hand graffiti.” Street art is “often purely artistic,” meaning
14
that it is “an aesthetic work that [the] general public is able to interpret.”
6 See ALEXANDRA DARRABY, 1 ART, ARTIFACT,ARCHITECTURE AND MUSEUM LAW
§ 1:18, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2014); Brittany M. Elias & Bobby Ghajar, Street
Art: The Everlasting Divide Between Graffiti Art and Intellectual Property Protection, 7
LANDSLIDE 48, 48 (2015).
7 DARRABY, supra note 6.
8 See Al Roundtree, Graffiti Artists “Get Up” in Intellectual Property’s Negative
Space, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 959, 963 (2013).
9 See id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 965.
12 Lerman, supra note 3, at 298–99.
13 DARRABY, supra note 6.
14 Lerman, supra note 3, at 298.
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This Note concentrates on unsanctioned or illegal graffiti, which
includes all the subsets and styles described above. Illegal graffiti is
created without the permission of the owner of the surface on which it is
15
painted and is illegal even if the work does not harm the property owner.
This Note will not include tagging within the definition of graffiti. Tagging
16
is not copyrightable under 37 C.F.R. § 202.1, which prohibits the
copyright of “[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and
slogans . . . mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or
17
coloring.” While the graffiti found most commonly in the 1970s would
not be copyrightable as it was mainly tagging, graffiti has grown into a
more expansive art form outside of tagging.
II.

FROM VANDALISM TO AN ARTISTIC MOVEMENT

Graffiti has developed from vandalism in the 1970s to a predominant,
widespread, and respected art movement. Prime Minister David Cameron
presented President Barack Obama with the graffiti work of Ben Eine on
his first trip to Washington. The work was a spray-painted alphabet on
18
shop shutters from London. Michelle Obama experimented with tagging
alongside a well-known British graffiti artist, Mr. Brainwash, as part of her
19
Let Girls Learn initiative. There is also the iconic Hope poster created by
20
Shepard Fairey during Obama’s presidential campaign.
Graffiti is not just accepted by political figures, but is also highly
regarded by museums and entire cities. In 2008, the Tate Modern held the
first major display of graffiti in London, showing six internationally
21
acclaimed graffiti artists.
Entire cities such as Melbourne, Warsaw,
22
Prague, and Paris have legalized graffiti. Some cities also provide “free
23
walls” where the city or owners grant space for the use of graffiti artists.

15
16

Id. at 311–12.
See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2016); see also Lerman, supra note 3, at 308–09, 308

n.58.
37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a).
David Cameron Presents Barack Obama with Graffiti Art, BBC NEWS (July 21,
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-10710074.
19 Mark Hensch, Michelle Obama Tries Out Graffiti Tag, HILL (Mar. 9, 2016, 3:52
PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/in-the-know/in-the-know/272413-michelle-obama-goesgraffiti-tagging-in-dc.
20 Shepard Fairey—Life and Biography: Controversy, Copyrights and Graffiti,
STENCIL
REVOLUTION,
http://www.stencilrevolution.com/profiles/shepardfairey/#The_Obama_HOPE_Poster. (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
21 Street
Art,
TATE
MODERN,
http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tatemodern/exhibition/street-art (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
22 Elias & Ghajar, supra note 6, at 51.
23 Roundtree, supra note 8, at 964.
17
18
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These free walls can also be unofficial spaces where the city does not
24
25
enforce vandalism laws, such as the zona de graffiti in Buenos Aires.
Unofficial graffiti zones or free walls are comparable to property
easements. If an individual consistently goes through his neighbor’s yard
to get to a lake and the owner does not protest, then this can create an
easement. Similarly, if graffiti artists consistently paint on a wall without
protest from the owner or the authorities, this can also create an easement.
The most pertinent type of easement relating to graffiti is easement by
prescription. This type of easement requires that the use of the property is
open and easily discoverable, the owner does not grant permission, and the
use is uninterrupted and continuous for a certain number of years according
26
to state statute. If the practices in these unofficial graffiti zones satisfy
these requirements, then they are easements and the graffiti is arguably no
longer unsanctioned.
The theory of a graffiti easement was argued in Cohen v. G & M
27
Realty L.P. This case involved the 5Pointz building in New York, an
unused warehouse whose owner originally welcomed graffiti artists to the
building. The owner “gave his oral blessings to permit qualified aerosol
28
artists . . . to display their works on his buildings.”
The owner
encouraged the graffiti artists, and 5Pointz became a significant tourist
29
attraction.
In this case, a group of graffiti artists sued the building’s
owner after it was announced that the building would be destroyed to build
30
new apartment homes. The plaintiffs brought suit under the VARA, and
also argued that one plaintiff had an easement in gross to use the building’s
31
surfaces. The court dismissed the easement argument, though, because an
easement in gross must be in writing, rather than in the form of a revocable
32
license. An easement by prescription was not considered, which could
have altered the opinion of the court on this matter, as this type of easement
does not require writing or even the owner’s permission.
Official zones of graffiti and the possibility of easements in such areas
illustrate some ways in which communities have accepted graffiti as an
important artistic movement and a defining characteristic in certain cities

Id.
Fasoli v. Voltage Pictures, LLC, No. 14-C-6206, 2014 WL 7365936, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 22, 2014).
26 See 3 Ways Easements Are Created, FIN. WEB, http://www.finweb.com/realestate/3-ways-easements-are-created.html#axzz45zyUvmif (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
27 988 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218–19 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
28 Id. at 219.
29 See id. at 214.
30 See infra Part III for an explanation of VARA and its application to graffiti art.
31 Cohen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 215 n.3.
32 Id.
24
25
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33

and areas. Presidents, prime ministers, museums, cities, and communities
encourage graffiti art, showing the importance of this artistic movement
and a change in public perception. In spite of graffiti’s prominence in the
artistic world, though, the world of intellectual property (IP) considers
unsanctioned graffiti a “negative space” where “areas and industries [are]
34
unregulated, or only partially regulated, by de jure IP law.” This Note
explores the negative space of graffiti to determine if unsanctioned graffiti
should be excluded from copyright protection.
III.

COPYRIGHT REQUIREMENTS

Under Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright
protection exists for “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
35
with the aid of a machine or device.” Among the list of protected works
36
are “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” Creators of original works
of visual art thereby have “the exclusive right to make, distribute, and sell
copies of the works, the right to create derivative works, and the right to
37
display their works publicly.” These rights extend for the lifetime of the
38
creator plus seventy years. A copyright exists at the time the work is
“fixed,” and an author need not register the work with the U.S. Copyright
39
Office in order to obtain protection.
Yet, registration creates legal
advantages to prove copyright ownership, notice of ownership, and
40
increased damages for unauthorized uses.
41
In 1990 Congress passed VARA, which amended the Copyright Act.
VARA protects works of visual art created on or after June 1, 1991, by

33 As another example, the Shoreditch neighborhood of London is arguably an
unofficial graffiti zone where graffiti is seen as part of the culture of the community and
street art tours are offered to explore and explain its importance. See Street Art Walking
Tour, YPLAN, https://yplanapp.com/london/street-art-walking-tour-36414/ (last visited Sept.
20, 2016).
34 Roundtree, supra note 8, at 961 (citing Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The
Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV.
1687, 1764 (2006) (coining the term “negative space” in IP)).
35 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
36 Id. § 102(a)(5).
37 Griffin M. Barnett, Recognized Stature: Protecting Street Art as Cultural Property,
12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 204, 206 (2013) (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106, 302(a)).
38 Id.
39 Roundtree, supra note 8, at 968.
40 Id.
41 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A).
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adding the protection of moral rights for certain works. Moral rights of
an artist protect “the artist’s personality and the work’s spirit and integrity
43
through preservation of the art.” Under VARA, the author of a visual
work has a right of authorship, right of integrity, and right against
44
destruction. The first right allows the artist to claim authorship, prevent
the use of her name in a work she did not create, and prevent the use of her
name in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or modification of the work
45
that would cause harm to her reputation. The right of integrity prevents
an intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification that would be
46
prejudicial to the artist’s reputation.
When looking purely at the statutory requirements without taking into
account the illegality of the creation act, graffiti qualifies for copyright
protection. Under Section 102, graffiti is a fixed original work of
authorship that qualifies for protection under “pictorial, graphic, and
47
sculptural works.”
Scholars and courts consider sanctioned graffiti
48
copyrightable.
The statutory fixation requirement could potentially create a difficulty
in justifying the copyrightability of graffiti. Section 101 of the Copyright
Act establishes that a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression
when it is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
49
transitory duration.” Graffiti is often temporary, in that it fades away or
50
is often painted over by the owner of the surface or another graffiti artist.
Some graffiti artists welcome other artists to paint over their work so as to
51
continue an “artistic dialogue.” Yet, this fading or painting over does not
preclude the justification of a copyright. A painting is no less fixed when
done on a wall as opposed to a canvas, as either surface can fade or be
painted over. For copyright purposes, a work need not be strictly and

42 Timothy Marks, Note, The Saga of 5Pointz: VARA’s Deficiency in Protecting
Notable Collections of Street Art, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 281, 285 (2015); see also 17
U.S.C. § 106A (providing the title to take effect six months after date of enactment of
VARA).
43 Elias & Ghajar, supra note 6, at 50.
44 Lerman, supra note 3, at 330.
45 Lerman, supra note 3, at 330 (quoting 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(1)–(2)).
46 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(3)(A), (c)(1)).
47 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
48 See Roundtree, supra note 8, at 968 (first citing Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC
Commc’ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2001); then citing Mager v. Brand New Sch., 78
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); and then citing Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., 697 F. Supp.
748 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
49 17 U.S.C. § 101.
50 Lerman, supra note 3, at 309–10.
51 Id. at 306.
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forever permanent, but must merely be “sufficiently permanent.” Graffiti
52
then qualifies as fixed under this definition.
Yet, trouble arises when graffiti’s illegality is taken into account.
Scholars against copyrighting graffiti have used Section 103 of the
53
Copyright Act to justify their arguments. Section 103 does not extend
copyright protection in compilations and derivative works that unlawfully
54
use copyrighted material. Yet, there is no explicit prohibition that illegal
work itself cannot be copyrighted, and courts have yet to rule definitively
55
on this matter.
IV.

EXTENDING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION TO UNSANCTIONED GRAFFITI
IN CASELAW

Copyright infringement cases involving graffiti are generally not
favorable to graffiti artists or are settled out of court. Yet, the cases
illustrate that courts approach unsanctioned graffiti art under a
copyrightability analysis rather than merely denying copyright protection
due to illegality of creation. In so doing, courts have implicitly accepted
that unsanctioned graffiti is copyrightable.
The most applicable graffiti case under VARA dealing with the
destruction of graffiti is English v. BFC & R. East 11th Street LLC, where
six artists created work in a community garden on East 11th Street.56 This
community garden was a city-owned lot until sold to BFC & R 11th Street
LLC.57 The artists based their claims under VARA, but BFC argued that
VARA was inapplicable because the artwork was illegally placed on the
property.58 The court concluded, “VARA is inapplicable to artwork that is
illegally placed on the property of others, without their consent, when such
artwork cannot be removed from the site in question.”59 Yet, it is arguable
that the case should not be read as preventing copyright claims over
unauthorized works because the Copyright Act states that VARA rights are
distinct from “ownership of any copy of that work.”60 Therefore, VARA
rights and copyright are distinct protections and this ruling does not
necessarily prevent artists from having a copyright claim for their artwork.

52 See id. at 309; see also Villa v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 03-C-3717, 2003 WL
22922178, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2003) (denying motion to dismiss copyright infringement
claim of graffiti).
53 See Elias & Ghajar, supra note 6, at 49.
54 17 U.S.C. § 103(a).
55 See Roundtree, supra note 8, at 968–69.
56 No. 97 Civ. 7446, 1997 WL 746444, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997).
57 Id.
58 See id. at *2–4.
59 Id. at *4.
60 Lerman, supra note 3, at 333 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2) (2012)).
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In Villa v. Pearson Education, Inc., a work of graffiti’s copyright
61
protection was challenged due to the work’s illegality. The graffiti artist
Hiram Villa, known as UNONE, brought an action for copyright
infringement against Pearson Education for publishing a book featuring his
62
murals entitled Tony Hawk’s Pro Skater 2 Official Strategy Guide. The
case was at first dismissed under lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
63
because Villa had not obtained a copyright registration in the work. Villa
64
then registered with the U.S. Copyright Office and filed a new suit.
Pearson moved to dismiss on the grounds that the murals were illegal
65
graffiti and thus not protectable under copyright law.
This illegality
defense echoes the doctrine of unclean hands. This doctrine began with the
general legal principle that “no one should benefit from his crimes,” and it
is defined as “one cannot seek protection under the law if he has acted
66
wrongly with respect to the matter of the complaint.” Yet, in a previous
motion, the district court found this argument unpersuasive, stating, “We
assume, without deciding, that the work is copyrightable and was, at some
67
point before its appearance in the Guide, fixed in a tangible form.” The
court denied the motion to dismiss because the copyrightability of the work
68
69
was a question of fact and the case then settled out of court. Yet, Villa
highlights that the court accepted, without deciding, that the unsanctioned
mural was copyrightable.
Many cases involving copyright infringement of unsanctioned graffiti
have settled out of court. One dispute involved Peter Rosenstein’s book
Tattooed Walls, which displayed over one hundred murals found in New
70
York City. A dozen artists whose works were featured in the book sought
a settlement, but Rosenstein argued that he did not need their permission
because “the murals were in public spaces” and his use was covered under
71
the fair use doctrine. In sum, Rosenstein defended himself on illegality
grounds, but also appealed to an exception to copyright liability—fair use.

61
62
63

Villa, 2003 WL 22922178, at *2.
Id.; Lerman, supra note 3, at 301.
Villa v. Brady Publ’g, No. 02-C-570, 2002 WL 1400345, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 2,

2002).
64
65
66
67

Villa, 2003 WL 22922178, at *1.
Id. at *2.
Lerman, supra note 3, at 316 (quoting 30A C.J.S. Equity § 109 (2013)).
Villa v. Brady Publ’g, No. 02-C-570, 2002 WL 1400345, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 27,

2002).
Villa, 2003 WL 22922178, at * 3.
Elias & Ghajar, supra note 6, at 49.
Lerman, supra note 3, at 300.
Id. at 301 (quoting David Gonzalez, Walls of Art for Everyone, but Made by Not
Just
Anyone,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
4,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/nyregion/04citywide.html).
68
69
70
71
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Adding fair use as an avenue of defense shows that Rosenstein recognized
that the court could have found the graffiti murals protected by copyright,
and that he would need the fair use doctrine to evade infringement liability.
The parties ultimately settled, and the book was taken off the publisher’s
72
catalogue.
In another dispute, the clothing company Urban Outfitters
printed t-shirts depicting the signature of graffiti artist Cali Killa. Urban
Outfitters discontinued the use of his work according to the terms of a
73
settlement. These severe settlements, resulting in the rescinding of the
books and clothing rather than just damages, reveal the power a copyright
infringement case can have for appropriation of unsanctioned graffiti.
In Reece v. Marc Ecko Unlimited, the graffiti artist Daniel Reece,
known as Dip, brought suit under Section 501 of the Copyright Act for
infringement of his artwork and persona, which were used in a video game
74
developed and sold by the defendants. The magistrate judge determined
that the name “Dip” is not protected by copyright law, that certain fonts or
lettering styles are “mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering
75
and coloring,” that use of certain colors is not itself subject to copyright
protection, and that copyright is not afforded to familiar symbols or designs
76
such as the circles, squares, and stars used to ornament the “i” in Dip.
The magistrate judge recommended that the defendant’s motion to dismiss
be granted due to the work’s inability to obtain a valid copyright because of
77
color, lettering, and fonts, but not because of its illegality.
In Seltzer v. Green Day, artist and illustrator Derek Selzter created
78
Scream Icon posters, which were sold and given away. His work was
prominently displayed across Los Angeles as street art. Green Day then
used the Scream Icon on its tour as a video backdrop to the song “East
79
Jesus Nowhere.” The work was modified with a red spray-painted cross
over the middle of the screaming face, a change in contrast and color, and
by adding black streaks running down the sides of the face. Yet, the
Scream Icon was still “clearly identifiable in the middle of the screen
80
throughout the video.”

Id.
Id. (citing Hrag Vartanian, Opinion, Street Artist Triumphs Over Urban Outfitters
Copyright Case, HYPERALLERGIC (Sept. 20, 2011), http://hyperallergic.com/36016/calikilla-urban-outfitters/).
74 No. 10-Civ-02901, 2011 WL 4112071, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2011).
75 Id. at *9 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2000)).
76 See id. at *8–10.
77 Id. at *16.
78 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2013).
79 Id. at 1174.
80 Id.
72
73
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In its motion for summary judgment below and on appeal, Green Day
argued the video backdrop constituted fair use under Section 107 of the
81
Copyright Act. Under this Section, fair use is determined by four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and sustainability of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
82
copyrighted work.

The first requirement illustrates the importance of transformation,
which means adding “something new, with a further purpose or different
83
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or message.”
The court determined that Green Day’s use was transformative because it
was only a component of a “street-art focused music video about
84
religion.” Green Day’s use was also only incidentally commercial, as it
85
never used it to market its concert, CDs, or merchandise.
Under the
second requirement, published works are more likely to qualify as fair use,
and Seltzer controlled the first public appearance of Scream Icon by
86
disseminating it throughout Los Angeles in poster form. Third, copying
little of the original work likely points to fair use, but here Green Day used
the entire image. Yet, the court stated that the entire work was necessary
87
and this factor did not weigh against Green Day. Finally, Seltzer testified
that Green Day’s use had “tarnished” him personally, but admitted the
value of his work was unchanged—this factor weighed in Green Day’s
88
89
favor. The court therefore concluded that it was fair use. This entire
fair use analysis presumes that Scream Icon was a copyrightable work,
even though it was illegally plastered on a wall. The court treated it as any
other work of art that had been sufficiently transformed.
Recently, graffiti artists have been more successful in maintaining
90
causes of action despite the illegality of their work. In a highly publicized
Id. at 1175.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1176 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 579 (1994)).
84 Id. at 1176.
85 Id. at 1178.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1178–79.
88 Id. at 1179.
89 Id.
90
For example, graffiti artists sued fashion designer Roberto Cavalli for the use of
their mural in his clothing designs. Williams v. Cavalli, No. CV 14–06659, 2015 WL
1247065, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015). Cavalli used high-resolution photography to
obtain images of the mural and rearranged the signatures of the artists, but kept the rest of
81
82
83
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91

recent case, pop musician Katy Perry attended the Met Gala wearing a
dress designed by Jeremy Scott, who replicated a mural by Joseph Tierney
92
or “Rime” for the dress’s fabric.
Tierney sued for copyright
infringement, falsification of copyright, unfair competition, appropriation
93
of name and likeness, and negligence.
The defendants, Scott and the
brand Moschino, asserted that they were exercising their constitutional
94
rights as a matter of public interest. The court found the dress qualified
as public interest because the designer and apparel brand are household
95
names in high fashion.
Tierney also alleged falsifying copyright
management information in a work of authorship under federal law because
putting “Moschino” on the dress with his graffiti falsely suggested that the
96
fashion brand made the design rather than Tierney.
the mural intact. Id. Cavalli also superimposed his brand name over images of the mural.
The artists complained that the designs damaged their reputations and credibility, bringing
suit under federal copyright law, as well as state statutory and common law. Id. The court
denied Cavalli’s motion to dismiss in 2015. Id. at *6; see also Fasoli v. Voltage Pictures,
LLC, No. 14-C-6206, 2014 WL 7365936 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2014) (street artists bring
copyright infringement action against California production companies for reproducing their
mural from the zona de graffiti in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in the film The Zero Theorem);
Complaint at 1–2, 4–5, Kosse v. Universal Music Grp., No. 1:16-cv-00160 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
12, 2016) (artist Kosse suing for copyright infringement based on display of his painted
mural in a Kiesza music video without permission).
91 Model Gigi Hadid also wore the dress on a catwalk in a 2015 fashion show and
Tierney also named Hadid in the suit. Tshepo Mokoena, Katy Perry’s Met Ball Dress the
Subject of Copyright Infringement Lawsuit, GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/music/2015/aug/06/katy-perry-met-ball-moschino-dresscopyright-infringement-lawsuit.
92 Eriq Gardner, Judge Allows Graffiti Artist’s Lawsuit over Katy Perry’s Met Gala
Dress, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/judgeallows-graffiti-artists-lawsuit-855973.
93 See Complaint at 9–17, Tierney v. Moschino S.p.A., No. 2:15-cv-05900 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 5, 2015).
94 See Tierney v. Moschino S.p.A., No. 2:15-cv-05900, slip op. at 10 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
13, 2016).
95 Id. at 11. Tierney also claimed that the dress constituted unfair competition and
violated his publicity rights. “Rime” appears on the dress, which Tierney argued could
create the false impression that he endorsed the collection. Complaint at 11–12, Tierney,
No. 2:15-cv-05900. This alleged false impression potentially could harm Tierney’s
“reputation and credibility in the art world.” Id. at 8. His complaint specified that he was
“diligent in controlling distribution channels of his work,” and due to this dress, many
people believed he was “selling out.” Id. Note that he has previously endorsed Disney and
Adidas. Gardner, supra note 92. The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and
allowed the claim of misuse of Tierney’s nickname even though pseudonyms are not
necessarily protected under California law. Tierney, slip op. at 9.
96 Tierney, slip op. at 4. Scott recently filed another motion to dismiss, which
compares Rime to the Black Dahlia murder. He stated, “The Black Dahlia’s killer was, no
doubt, a felon. But was he also a valuable copyright holder as a result of his illegal
activities?” Ellie Shechet, Jeremy Scott’s Lawyers Compare Graffiti Artist Suing Him to
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These cases reveal that courts tend to analyze cases regarding
unsanctioned graffiti on the premise that such works are copyrightable,
though they have not held explicitly that such works hold valid copyrights.
They have focused on copyright defenses in dismissing causes of action,
rather than the defense of illegality. Courts have had ample opportunities
to rule that unsanctioned art is not copyrightable and thereby end the
debate, but they have chosen to analyze the cases as copyright
infringements and dismiss or allow them to continue on grounds of
statutory copyright law. This widespread judicial approach gives weight to
the argument that unsanctioned graffiti is copyrightable.
V.

DOES GRAFFITI DESERVE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION UNDER AN
INCENTIVE-BASED THEORY OF IP?

While courts have not explicitly stated that unsanctioned graffiti
deserves copyright protection, the incentive-based theory of intellectual
property requires this protection for graffiti. This theoretical foundation
constructs copyright as necessary to “provide[] an incentive for authors to
97
create and disseminate works of social value.” The American IP regime
widely accepts the incentive-based theory as the primary justification for
copyright. The IP clause of the Constitution states that IP laws are to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
98
Writings and Discoveries.”
Though scholars have proposed various
99
justifications for copyright law, American courts tend to interpret the IP
clause as authorizing Congress to legislate to confer rewards on creators
that will incentivize them to make and disseminate works, thereby
contributing to the progress of society. In Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., for example, the Supreme Court stated that
copyright’s monopoly privileges are “intended to motivate the creative
100
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward.”
The incentive-based argument asserts that if free-riders are allowed to
101
appropriate another’s work then authors will cease to create.
As applied
to the graffiti movement, copyright protection is necessary to encourage
‘the Black Dahlia’s Killer’, JEZEBEL: THE MUSE (May 1, 2016, 12:00 PM),
http://themuse.jezebel.com/jeremy-scotts-lawyers-compare-the-graffiti-artist-suing1774240147. Scott creatively argued that the murderer killed the victim with artistic
originality, but the murderer could not sue for copyright of photos of the murders. Id.
97 Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197,
1197 (1996).
98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
99 See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The
Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (1990).
100 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
101 See id.
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artists to continue creating graffiti without the fear of “free-riding
102
copyists” such as Pearson Education, Green Day, Roberto Cavalli, and
Moschino.
103
Harm to reputation can disincentivize an artist to continue her work.
Copyright law chooses to recognize reputation as a valid means of
104
protection for certain visual arts under VARA.
In the context of the
graffiti movement, reputation is a key component of a graffiti artist’s
identity and work. In Williams v. Cavalli, reputation was an important
concern, and the graffiti artists argued that the use of their artwork in the
105
Cavalli Collection damaged their “reputation and credibility.”
In the
case of Katy Perry’s dress, Tierney argued that he was accused of “selling
out” by appearing to have endorsed Katy Perry and a high-end fashion
106
collection, which harmed his credibility in the art community. In a world
where many artists attempt to remain anonymous and keep an air of
rebellion, appropriation of graffiti artists’ works for commercial gain could
disincentivize artists from continuing their work by harming their
reputations.
The problem of using incentive theory to justify copyrighting graffiti
art, though, is that in many instances, the given copyright protections
would be incentivizing an illegal activity. Celia Lerman, an IP scholar
from Columbia Law School and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Buenos
Aires, Argentina), argues that extending copyright protection to
unsanctioned graffiti would not encourage illegal activity because it would
107
help artists to view the law as their ally.
Artists would more quickly
become prestigious and therefore be able to paint legally on walls more
108
readily because their artwork would be desired and sought after.
On the
other hand, Brittany Elias, a recent law student, and Bobby Ghajar, a trial
attorney leading his firm’s worldwide trademark group, argue that
extending copyright protection would not incentivize the creation of more
street art because in the past decade street art has flourished without

Sterk, supra note 97, at 1207.
But see id. at 1242 (arguing that copyright is unnecessary to protect against harm to
reputation when defamation law can provide an adequate remedy).
104 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2012) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art . . . shall have
the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the
event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation. . . .”).
105 No. CV 14–06659, 2015 WL 1247065, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015).
106 Complaint at 8, Tierney v. Moschino S.p.A., No. 2:15-cv-05900 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5,
2015).
107 See Lerman, supra note 3, at 324.
108 See id.
102
103
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protection and the negative space of IP in this area has not destroyed the
109
prevalence of graffiti.
Instead of asking if graffiti artists would be incentivized to innovate,
though, a better question exists: What is the incentive for copyright law to
exclude graffiti? As previously established, graffiti should, on its face,
qualify for protection under the Copyright Act, as it is an original and fixed
110
work of authorship.
Since it satisfies these statutory requirements for
protection, and the question becomes what reason copyright law has to
refuse it protection, which can only be rationalized based on the illegality
of the act.
Lerman argues that illegal graffiti still warrants copyright protection
111
because copyright should be neutral to the issue of illegality.
She states,
“Because copyright should only be concerned with the immaterial work,
the artist’s material transgressions should not exclude the work from
112
copyright protection.”
Lerman asserts that the wrongdoing is irrelevant
to the copyrightability of the work because copyright law does not impose
negative consequences for illegal acts, and the illegal acts should be
113
addressed under civil sanctions and criminal penalties.
The text of the
Copyright Act supports this formulation. The Act states, “Ownership of a
copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct
114
from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.”
Accordingly, copyright protection is concerned with the intangible work,
which is protected independently from its physical embodiment. The
illegality of that physical embodiment, then, should not affect the
115
copyrightability of the intangible work.
In contrast, Professor Eldar Haber compares graffiti to child
116
pornography and argues that the law should not condone such works. He
alleges that graffiti is undesirable and illegal. Similar to Lerman, he
acknowledges that the content of the work is disconnected from the
117
criminal activity.
Yet, he still opposes copyright protection because “the

See Elias & Ghajar, supra note 6, at 51.
See supra Part III.
Lerman, supra note 3, at 296.
Id. Lerman cites numerous examples of illegal acts that retain copyright
protection, such as paparazzi photographs that violate a celebrity’s privacy; a journalist’s
article that revealed state secrets; and a student painting of a minor killing a policeman even
though it could constitute an illegal threat under criminal law. Id. at 317–18.
113 Id. at 316.
114 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
115 See Lerman, supra note 3, at 316.
116 See Eldar Haber, Copyrighted Crimes: The Copyrightability of Illegal Works, 16
YALE J.L. & TECH. 454, 485–86 (2014).
117 Id.
109
110
111
112
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law should not aid in creating social injustice,”
whether that be
protecting the pornographic photo of a child or a mural vandalizing a wall.
Congress should therefore suppress these undesirable works by blocking
119
legal incentives in their creation.
This argument is justified in
accordance with child pornography where the contents of the photo itself
are illegal, not just the act of depicting those contents. In contrast, the act
of painting on a wall without the owner’s permission is not tied to the
intellectual property in the work, where the content itself is not illegal. If
the same were painted on a canvas it would be legal, but a pornographic
photo of a child printed on any medium is illegal. Therefore, this extreme
comparison and argument does not hold ground.
VI.

THE ACCOMMODATING NATURE OF COPYRIGHT LAW

Graffiti should receive copyright protection because copyright is a
flexible and adaptable law that looks towards the future by promoting
progress. Throughout copyright’s history, the law has recognized growing
art forms and extends rights to them. Graffiti is the newest of these art
forms. Copyright law should protect graffiti for the sake of efficiency and
lack of contradiction because the law is continually expanding to accept
new art forms.
The justification for copyright to protect graffiti can be shown by a
historical comparison with motion pictures. The Townsend Amendment of
120
1912 extended copyright protection to motion pictures.
Before this
amendment, motion pictures were protected as photographs by assigning a
121
copyright to each still of the film, which originally made sense in the
122
early development of motion pictures as stop-motion photography.
The
congressional report regarding the Townsend Amendment explained, “The
occasion for this proposed amendment is the fact that the production of
123
motion-picture[s] . . . has become a business of vast proportions.”
The
124
first film to gain international success was created in 1902, and ten years
later all motion pictures gained copyright protection in the United States.
The legislature therefore recognized the growing importance of motion
pictures and granted them protection. Without such copyright protection, it
Id. at 485.
Id. at 485–86.
WILLIAM F. PATRY, 1 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:47, Westlaw (database updated
Sept. 2016).
121 Id.
122 David A. Cook & Robert Sklar, History of the Motion Picture, ENCYC. BRITANNICA
(Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.britannica.com/art/history-of-the-motion-picture.
123 PATRY, supra note 120 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 62-756, at 1 (1912); S. REP. NO. 62906, at 1 (1912)).
124 See Cook & Sklar, supra note 122. The film was titled Le Voyage dans la Lune
and produced by the French filmmaker Georges Méliès.
118
119
120
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is likely that efficiency would have suffered due to the countless lawsuits
that would have been brought in order to protect each photo still of a film.
While the graffiti movement is not as predominant or commercialized
as motion pictures, it is still a growing and widespread movement that has
gained notoriety and respect. It has been over four decades since the
beginning of the graffiti art movement, and the amount of litigation
surrounding it is growing. As graffiti becomes more mainstream, more
free-riders will attempt to profit off of these artists. The number of
ongoing cases listed in Part IV illustrates that lawsuits in this area are
multiplying. Forcing artists to continuously litigate to protect their
intellectual property or use litigation as a threat to create a settlement does
not promote progress, but stagnates it with inefficiency.
Copyright has stayed at the forefront of protecting new innovations
125
and art forms from sound recordings to architectural works.
Copyright
law therefore does not exclude new art forms, but recognizes their
importance. Graffiti is no longer vandalism, but a recognized and
important artistic expression that has been legalized in community zones
and entire cities. An argument based on illegality would have been
successful in the 1970s, but due to modern society’s acceptance of graffiti,
that argument is disintegrating.
Excluding graffiti from copyright
protection, even though it already meets the statutory requirements for
copyrightability, goes against the spirit of a law that should remain at the
forefront of protecting new art forms. The continuous amendment of
Section 102 to encompass new art mediums teaches that copyright is meant
to expand under the broad framework of the Constitution. Accordingly,
copyright law should accept that graffiti holds a place under Section 102 as
an efficient means of recognizing a modern artistic movement.
CONCLUSION
The list of copyrightable subject matter is ever expanding. Choosing
to exclude graffiti when it satisfies the threshold for protection in the
Copyright Act and has been implicitly accepted by courts would go against
the promotion of progress that copyright law is meant to foster under the
incentive theory of copyright law. The growing amount of litigation will
create further inefficiencies in the judiciary as the graffiti movement
continues to grow more mainstream, which makes it a more desirable
commodity that third parties will try to profit off of for free. While graffiti
is still an illegal activity, in many areas it has become sanctioned by law or
implicitly through the theory of easements. An argument to exclude
copyright protection for graffiti lacks merit when taking into account the
growing legality and acceptance of this art form. Copyright law may not
wish to incentivize an illegal activity, but copyright law is not meant to
125

See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
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deny protection to new art forms and create inefficiency. When balancing
these reasons, efficiency and continuing a tradition of expanding copyright
protection for new art forms is more persuasive than an illegality argument
that is beginning to wash away.

